US Vice-President JD Vance’s Munich Security Conference speech sounded more like a manifesto than a diplomatic address. His sharp critique of Europe’s handling of democratic processes — specifically referencing Romania’s decision to annul its presidential election — was not just a rhetorical jab but a calculated maneuver to defend the global rise of far-right politics. It was a speech aimed at Europe, but its implications reverberate far beyond the continent.
Vance’s remarks, coming just days before Germany’s national elections, underscored a deeper ideological alignment between the US’ current far-right administration and an emboldened European far right. Germany’s far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) became the second-largest political force in the Bundestag after achieving a historic result in the election, marking the most significant ascent of a far-right party in Germany since World War II. The parallels to America’s political trajectory under the current administration are unmistakable, with the AfD drawing inspiration from the populist, nationalist playbook that has redefined US politics.
At the core of Vance’s critique was the idea of “free speech” and “the voice of the people”, which, to his way of thinking, were under siege in Europe. His condemnation of Romania’s constitutional court’s decision to cancel the election because of alleged foreign interference — an effort to prevent far-right candidate Calin Georgescu from taking power — was framed as a betrayal of democracy. Similarly, his criticism of Germany’s “firewall” against the AfD targeted the practice of mainstream parties systematically excluding right-wing political forces from coalitions. In Vance’s view, these actions were not safeguards for democracy but rather evidence of elitist suppression of populist movements.
But this worldview, while couched in the language of democracy and free speech, is fundamentally a defense of far-right ideology. It reflects an administration in Washington that was elected on the wave of nationalist, isolationist sentiment — a movement that has grown increasingly transnational. Like the Reagan-era export of conservative ideology in the 1980s, the current US government seeks to export far-right populism to Europe and beyond, framing it as the champion of “the people” against the technocratic, globalist establishment.
The rise of far-right parties across Europe is not a new phenomenon, but the pace and scale of their ascent are accelerating. Germany’s AfD, France’s National Rally, and Italy’s Brothers of Italy are just a few examples of parties that have been transformed from fringe movements to legitimate political contenders. These groups have harnessed public discontent over immigration, economic inequality and cultural identity, creating a potent mix of nationalism and populism that resonates with millions of voters.
In Germany, the AfD’s growth mirrors a broader European trend. The party’s anti-immigrant rhetoric and euroscepticism have struck a chord in a nation grappling with the challenges of integration and a slowing economy. While mainstream parties have long maintained a “firewall” against the AfD — refusing to form coalitions or grant it legitimacy — this strategy is under strain. As Vance pointed out, millions of voters feel alienated by a political class that appears unwilling to engage with their concerns.
In Romania, the decision to annul last year’s presidential election after intelligence uncovered foreign interference highlights the complexity of the far-right’s rise. Georgescu’s unexpected success in the first-round vote was not just a domestic political story but part of a broader trend of far-right movements gaining support through grassroots campaigns and sometimes, foreign assistance.
With the current US administration openly aligned with far-right ideology, the rhetoric from Washington is emboldening similar movements abroad. Vance’s remarks in Munich were not just a defense of European far-right parties; they were a signal of support. By framing the “firewall” against the AfD and the annulment of Romania’s election as attacks on democracy, Vance sought to legitimize the far-right’s grievances and validate its rise.
In the next four years, the geopolitical landscape will be shaped by a contest between competing visions of governance — one rooted in nationalism and isolationism, and the other in cooperation and multilateralism. The stakes could not be higher
This alignment marks a significant shift in US foreign policy. Historically, the US has been a champion of liberal democracy, often promoting pluralism and multilateralism as pillars of a stable international order. The current administration, however, has embraced a form of isolationist nationalism that rejects these values. This shift is evident not only in its rhetoric but also in its actions, from withdrawing from international agreements to reducing commitments to global alliances.
The export of far-right ideology has profound implications for global politics. If more countries in the West adopt the isolationist policies championed by the US and its far-right allies, the result will be what I call “cooperatively uncooperative” geopolitics. Nations may align with each other on specific issues — such as anti-immigration policies or trade protectionism. The broader trend will be one of fragmentation, with countries retreating from multilateral cooperation in favor of narrow national interests.
Italy offers a glimpse of this potential future. Under Giorgia Meloni — whose government is the most right-wing since 1945 — Italy, once one of the friendliest nations to China in Europe, has pivoted away from its previous international commitments. The decision to withdraw from China’s Belt and Road Initiative is emblematic of this shift. While framed as a move to safeguard national sovereignty, it also reflects the broader isolationist tendencies of far-right governments. What’s worse is the potential tendency to align with the US’ illegitimate and unfounded antipathy toward China.
The rise of the far right in the West presents both challenges and opportunities for global powers like China. As the West retreats from multilateralism, China can fill the power gap by positioning itself as a champion of international cooperation. To do so, it should adopt a multipronged strategy:
First, capitalize on the West’s retreat. China should actively engage with countries that are disillusioned with the West’s inward turn. By offering economic partnerships and development projects, and playing a more important role in international organizations, it can strengthen its influence in regions where the West is losing ground.
Second, engage with non-far-right governments. Not all Western nations are embracing far-right ideologies. For example, the United Kingdom, currently led by a Labour government, remains a potential partner for China. Strengthening ties with such nations can help counterbalance the influence of far-right administrations in the West, and win diplomatic friends for the future.
Third, mitigate damage from far-right policies. Far-right governments often pursue policies that are detrimental to long-term cooperation. China should work to minimize the impact of these policies, ensuring they do not create lasting barriers to future engagement.
Ultimately, the far-right surge in the West is not an isolated phenomenon but part of a broader ideological shift with global implications. While Vance framed his critique of Europe as a defense of democracy, his remarks revealed a deeper agenda: the normalization and promotion of far-right populism as a legitimate political force. For nations seeking to maintain a stable international order, the challenge will be to counter this trend without falling into the traps of polarization and isolationism.
In the next four years, the geopolitical landscape will be shaped by a contest between competing visions of governance — one rooted in nationalism and isolationism, and the other in cooperation and multilateralism. The stakes could not be higher.
The author is a consultant at the Global Hong Kong Institute.
The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.
