When Taiwan’s new leader, Lai Ching-te, took office in May, I contended that as a weak leader, Lai needed to consolidate his political support base, which was composed of die-hard “Taiwan independence” forces (TIF). To this end, he would put forward increasingly extreme “Taiwan independence” ideas and policies to provoke the Chinese mainland and use the mainland’s retaliatory actions to inspire unity among the TIF, thereby strengthening the foundation of his governance.
The changes in the island’s political situation over the past year have corroborated my prognosis. In fact, because of the profound transformation of the international situation and the increasingly hard-line policy of the mainland toward Taiwan separatists, Lai and the TIF have become increasingly isolated both abroad and at home. As a result, Lai’s words and deeds have become more extreme, provocative, and dangerous.
For Taiwan, the most critical development in the international situation is Donald Trump’s re-election as president of the United States. What Trump advocates and pursues is a policy of external retrenchment and unilateralism that minimizes the US’ security guarantees for allies and partners, requires or browbeats them to increase their defense spending, and damages their economic interests. Under this unprecedented “America First” foreign policy, the US is striving to end the Russia-Ukraine conflict as soon as possible. Trump even hinted at withdrawing from NATO and pulling US troops from Europe. All of this has alarmed US allies in Europe and Asia. The drastic changes in US foreign policy have made more people believe that the US will not go to war with China over the Taiwan question. From a military perspective, China’s rapid growth in military power means that the US no longer has the necessary military capability to protect the island.
In recent years, an increasing number of US officials and experts have also come to the view that it is not worth sacrificing US security and interests for Taiwan. For one thing, Trump has never promised to send troops to “defend” Taiwan, and he has not made any plausible security commitments to Taiwan since taking office.
Darren J Beattie, appointed by Trump as the undersecretary for public diplomacy, remarked in 2024 that “Taiwan will inevitably belong to China; it’s only a matter of time. A grand deal should be struck (with China) — we agree to acknowledge this reality in exchange for massive concessions from China on Africa and Antarctica.”
In recent years, an increasing number of American experts have come to the view that the US would likely lose a war across the Taiwan Strait. Accordingly, Taiwan’s strategic value to the US has rapidly depreciated. Today, an increasing number of American experts even believe that the US should avoid any defense commitment to Taiwan.
In September 2020, American foreign policy analyst Bonnie S Glaser and others argued that, “Given the many domestic problems confronting the United States, devoting scarce dollars to defending Taiwan is arguably not the best way to make the country safer, more prosperous, or more competitive with China.”
In April 2021, political scientist Charles L Glaser asserted that Taiwan is not a vital US interest. He reasoned that “even amid a war in which China managed to close off the South China Sea, shipping that usually entered that sea after passing through the Strait of Malacca could instead bypass the South China Sea, reaching Japan and South Korea via the archipelagic waters of Indonesia and the Philippines.”
In August 2024, US Naval War College Professor Jonathan D Caverley stated that “China already possesses formidable space, land, air, sea, and cybersystems designed to detect and destroy US and allied naval and air platforms far from the mainland. It does not need the island to menace the United States.”
US scholars Jennifer Kavanagh and Stephen Wertheim put it more bluntly in an article published in Foreign Affairs in February. They argued: “The benefits of keeping Taiwan free would have to be weighed against the costs of waging the first armed conflict between great powers since 1945. Even if the United States prevailed — and it might well lose — an outright war with China would likely kill more Americans and destroy more wealth than any conflict since the Vietnam War and perhaps since World War II. Nuclear and cyberweapons could make it worse, bringing destruction to the US homeland. These would be catastrophic consequences for the United States.”
The TIF have always tried to convince Taiwan residents that if the mainland were to take the island by force, the US would come to defend it. However, today the security guarantee given to Taiwan by both the US government and the public has become opaque and unreliable. Therefore, the change in the US’ attitude toward Taiwan will undoubtedly continue to erode the mass base of the TIF, making them increasingly unpopular and isolated on the island. The US reversal of its stance on the Russia-Ukraine conflict has made the TIF extremely panicked, confused, and in disarray.
On the other hand, since Lai came to power, the mainland’s policy toward Taiwan has become increasingly stringent, and its efforts to crack down on TIF have become more precise and effective. The more frequent and large-scale island-encircling military exercises conducted by the People’s Liberation Army have made all parties believe that the mainland has the military capacity to block or take the island by force quickly. The mainland has intensified its efforts to enforce mainland laws on Taiwan in various areas, mainly by strengthening law enforcement in the waters and airspace surrounding the island. The mainland has promulgated and enforced laws to punish those advocating “Taiwan independence”, continuously weakening its economic and trade ties with Taiwan, and increasingly isolating it in the international arena.
Under the external and internal pressure, Taiwan’s economic and civil problems continue to deteriorate, with social division and infighting intensifying by the day. Lai leads a weak government, and his Democratic Progressive Party is a minority in the island’s legislature. Over the past year or so, with the cooperation of the Kuomintang and the Taiwan People’s Party, there have been acrimonious party struggles in the “legislative yuan”, and the Lai government has had great difficulty in governing.
Under the double blows of internal and external difficulties, Lai, who is becoming increasingly isolated politically, is attempting to consolidate and expand his support base by intensifying cross-Strait conflicts, creating a tense and horrible atmosphere on the island, and provoking stern responses from the mainland.
To deliberately provoke the mainland to the maximum extent, Lai announced 17 provocative strategies against the mainland on March 13 after convening a high-level “security” meeting, portraying the mainland as a “hostile external force”. Lai’s designation of the mainland as a “hostile external force” in effect defines cross-Strait relations as an enemy relationship. This violates the one-China principle, pushing the island into a dangerous situation.
The purpose of these 17 strategies is not only to weaken cross-Strait relations, especially people-to-people exchanges, but also to make Lai’s government more authoritarian, and intimidate Taiwan society. This is undoubtedly a severe regression of Taiwan’s political conditions. They have shattered the flimsy facade of its “democratic politics” and have seriously undermined its human rights, freedom, the rule of law, and reputation. Developments in Taiwan suggest that Lai is taking calculated risks and striving to survive. From another perspective, the mainland’s all-around containment of Taiwan has achieved considerable results, dealing a heavy blow to the TIF and leaving them in disarray, at a loss, angry, and fearful. Of course, the dramatic changes in the US political situation have unintentionally provided considerable support to the mainland’s policy to corner the TIF.
It now appears that the island’s politics are entering a vicious cycle, and the TIF are digging their graves. Looking ahead, while the US will not make solid and credible security commitments to Taiwan, it will still use coercion and inducement to exploit and plunder Taiwan under the motto of “America First”, such as forcing the island to purchase more American goods and Treasury bonds, as well as large quantities of inferior US weapons at high prices, and forcing its chip giant TSMC to transfer more advanced manufacturing processes to the US. The scope and intensity of the mainland’s containment strategy against the TIF will increase. To struggle for survival, the TIF are likely to intensify their high-handed rule and suppress their dissidents in Taiwan to create divisions and confrontations in society and wantonly undermine relations with the mainland. Still, they will be highly sycophantic and servile to the US. Under this harsh political situation, Taiwan’s economy, people’s livelihoods, and development are likely to decline further. The development of various events is expected to leave Taiwan residents increasingly angry and disillusioned with the TIF, prompting deep concerns about Taiwan’s future, which will ultimately lead to the irreversible decline of the TIF.
The author is a professor emeritus of sociology, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and a consultant for the Chinese Association of Hong Kong and Macao Studies.
The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.
