Xia Baolong, director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council, pointed out on National Security Education Day in April 2023 that we must “be vigilant against soft confrontation (SC) covertly causing chaos, and against anti-Hong Kong activities overseas that may spill over into Hong Kong”.

SC behavior is covert, opaque, and poorly organized, making it challenging to detect. It appears to be in a legally gray area, skirting the line of the law, and is, therefore, difficult to address through legal means. Of course, some SC behaviors can be prohibited by amending existing laws or enacting new ones; however, many SC behaviors are challenging to define clearly in law.

In Hong Kong, SC perpetrators generally strive to influence or change people’s cognition and understanding of things through intimation, inducement, misguidance, innuendo, sarcasm, vilification, metaphor, rumor-mongering, indirect criticism, false information,  and spreading conspiracy theories, which are intended to create unrest, chaos and panic in society in order to achieve various political goals.

Since SC primarily appears in the ideological sphere, culture, education, art, sports, and online and offline media have become major platforms for such behavior. Under the protection of the nation’s Constitution and the Basic Law, Hong Kong residents enjoy freedom of speech and expression. Therefore, hostile forces at home and abroad have ample and diverse opportunities and channels to engage in SC in Hong Kong.

The 2019-20 riots were brought under control following the promulgation of the National Security Law for Hong Kong in June 2020, which, together with the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance enacted in 2024, forms a robust national security regime.

Since then, with peace and order restored, “hard confrontation” behavior has nearly disappeared.

But hostile forces at home and abroad will not cease their disruptive activities and allow Hong Kong to remain at peace. They are still resentful and aggrieved over their failure to seize the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region’s governing power through the “Hong Kong-style color revolution”. They reject Hong Kong’s constitutional and political order. Therefore, they continue to attempt to undermine its stability, adding to difficulties in the governance of the HKSAR, and persist in making the city a place that poses a threat to national security. Since it is challenging to engage in “hard confrontation”, SC has become an essential or “default” means of political struggle for them. In this regard, external hostile forces, with their vast resources, extensive networks, capabilities, and experience, pose a greater threat to China’s national security and Hong Kong’s stability than local ones, which are becoming increasingly isolated, fragmented, and weakened.

About a decade ago, the United States defined China as a “strategic competitor” and launched an all-round campaign to contain the country, particularly through ideological infiltration and subversion. In future, the US is expected to intensify its efforts to curb China’s rise and the HKSAR’s development, with a focus on discrediting both internationally, as well as within the city. In September, the US House of Representatives passed a $1.6 billion appropriation to launch a global smear campaigns against China. It is foreseeable that external forces will continue to launch propaganda wars against Hong Kong, aiming to undermine its international image, stability and development, as well as its contribution to national development.

Amid an increasingly complex, treacherous and turbulent global landscape, safeguarding national security remains a top priority for Hong Kong, as Xia stressed in his speech marking the 10th anniversary of the National Security Education Day on Tuesday.

Deterred by the national security laws, anti-China forces in Hong Kong have significantly scaled back their disruptive activities.

However, they still try to seize opportunities from time to time to make speeches, comments, reports, analyses, and performances that are misleading and divisive, or propagate false information about or biased criticism of Hong Kong, in their attempt to foment discontent in the city. Most of these SC behaviors occur on the internet, where supervision is relatively lax. Many SC activists are die-hard anti-China agitators who have fled abroad, anti-China foreign figures, or “Taiwan independence” separatists.

It is challenging to accurately assess the actual impact of SC on Hong Kong from external or internal hostile forces, but it should not be underestimated. In the increasingly complex international environment and cross-Strait situation, we should employ bottom-line thinking and prudent methods to respond to SC. Its role in poisoning the minds of young people in Hong Kong particularly deserves society’s attention.

Since SC is often challenging to address through legal means, political and educational approaches are more pertinent and practical. The primary purpose is to enable Hong Kong residents, particularly young people, to gain a clear understanding of key issues. When dealing with SC, it is essential to have thorough considerations. On the one hand, Hong Kong must appropriately, proactively, and firmly respond to SC; on the other hand, it must strive to maintain social harmony and unity, create a political atmosphere that makes people feel at ease and free to put forward well-intentioned and constructive suggestions and criticisms on the HKSAR government and public affairs, and build an environment conducive to deepening foreign exchanges and cooperation and conducting investment and business.

Accordingly, the better approach is to make use of “smart countermeasures”, or “intelligent countermeasures”, which involve using clever means to counter and restrain SC.

First, the government and all sectors of society must publicly and robustly denounce those SC remarks and actions, and clearly point out their fallacies to set the record straight, thereby preventing them from fomenting and spreading in society. Hong Kong’s key opinion leaders should play a crucial role in this regard.

Second, the government and Hong Kong society should take every opportunity to promote national education and national security education, and enhance Hong Kong residents’ correct understanding of relevant matters, especially the original intention and basic principles of “one country, two systems”, the central government’s policies toward Hong Kong, and the significant policies of the HKSAR government, thus giving people “disinfection jabs”. Leaders in the education sector bear considerable responsibility in this regard.

Third, the government and all sectors of society must employ a high degree of political acumen to address SC and avoid falling into its traps. After all, one of the reasons why the SC perpetrators engage in such activities is to hopefully provoke excessive, inappropriate, and hasty reactions from the government and political figures, thereby stirring up controversy and contradictions in society and creating psychological resistance to the central and HKSAR governments in people’s minds, as well as damaging Hong Kong’s international image.

Fourth, the government and the public must be able to clearly distinguish between SC actors with ulterior motives and people who support the government and aim to improve its performance with their constructive criticisms.

Finally, combating SC should be viewed as a crucial political project for the central government, the HKSAR government, and patriotic forces to win over the hearts and minds of the people against hostile forces both at home and abroad. In promoting this project, the HKSAR government must assume the responsibility of leading all sectors of society to work together. In this way, when dealing with SC, it can also foster social solidarity and cooperation concomitantly.

The author is a professor emeritus of sociology, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and a consultant for the Chinese Association of Hong Kong and Macao Studies.

The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.