The US’ Capitol Hill was inundated with the perceived threat posed by China following the House of Representatives passing 25 pieces of legislation purportedly aimed at addressing national and economic security risks. Congress’ recent surge of activity, coined as “China Week”, has extended beyond a wide range of technology industries, including biotech, electric vehicles, and drones, in which China enjoys advantages, to secure a technological edge over China in the ongoing tech war. This legislative drive is part of Washington’s broader strategy to limit China’s influence through a “small yard, high fence” approach, aimed at giving the US a competitive edge in its ongoing rivalry with China.
However, the legislative actions taken during “China Week” have escalated the confrontation between the two countries to a new level and have dampened the prospects of improving relations. A series of bills was included in what hawkish congressional members referred to as “safeguarding Americans against military, economic, ideological, and technological threats posed by the Chinese Communist Party”. The US Senate also must approve the legislation and US President Joe Biden must sign it for it to become law.
Is the bellicose rhetoric merely serving electoral purposes, or does the combative mood in Congress following its members’ return from the summer recess genuinely reflect the future direction of China-US relations? Are congressional members overly paranoid about the “China threat”, or are they using it as a pretext to keep China in check? The series of bills introduced by a significant number of House representatives during “China Week” could potentially mislead the US public about the true nature of China, and reinforce Beijing’s perception that the US is determined to curb China’s rise by any means necessary.
According to the US-China Business Council, approximately 700 pieces of China-related legislation have been introduced in the current two-year congressional session. While the vast majority of bills failed to pass in Congress, 78 of them have become law since January 2023. The proliferation of China-related legislation in Congress underscores the prevailing political climate in Washington, where taking a tough stance on China is seen as politically expedient. Framing issues in terms of the “China threat” and “national security risks” linked to the “Chinese Communist Party’s assertiveness” has become a common strategy for US politicians.
This narrative of countering China is often portrayed as heroic behavior, while any ties to China can make politicians vulnerable to attacks, even for seemingly innocuous engagements. Tim Walz, the Democrats’ vice-presidential nominee, faces criticism simply for having spent a year in China teaching English and American history at a high school in Foshan, Guangdong province, and having visited the country around 30 times.
Leading up to the US presidential election in November, “China Week” may provide a glimpse into the future trajectory of US-China relations, irrespective of the election outcome. The legislation introduced during this period appears to be aimed at preparing and empowering the incoming administration to navigate Washington’s strategic rivalry with Beijing effectively. However, this approach may inadvertently contribute to further disengagement between the two countries, following trends of economic decoupling and strategic derisking.
First, the tech war between the US and China is expected to escalate, expanding beyond chips to include batteries and biotechnology.
The Biden administration has implemented stricter export controls on crucial technologies like quantum computing and semiconductor manufacturing goods, which are essential for advancements in artificial intelligence.
In the realm of green technology, China’s advantage is being targeted with a 100-percent tariff on its electric vehicles. For instance, Contemporary Amperex Technology, a Chinese company, faced scrutiny over supplying lithium-ion battery technology to Ford Motor Co for its Detroit factory project, ultimately leading to the deal falling through.
The Biosecure Act introduced during “China Week” aims to restrict US federal agencies from engaging with Chinese biotech companies and their clients, with a focus on “reducing dependence” on Chinese manufacturing and research. While such measures may impact drug supplies in the US, Congress is adamant about pushing for “reduced reliance” on Chinese entities and preventing American health data from being transferred to China.
Second, investment restrictions between China and the US have had a significant impact on business opportunities for both nations, particularly with further limitations on direct investment in the high-tech sector. These restrictions are reshaping various industries and sectors in both countries, influencing the flow of capital and technology transfer between them.
Chinese direct investment in the US has been on a downward trend, with data indicating a sharp drop in Chinese foreign direct investment in recent years. Once a major investor in the US, China has seen its annual investments plummet from $53.5 billion in 2016 to $1.7 billion in 2023, as reported by the American Enterprise Institute. This decline has shifted China from being among the top five investors in the US to a second-tier player over the past seven years.
Despite the resilience of the US economy and a post-pandemic foreign investment surge, the absence of Chinese companies in investment activities in the US is notable. US industrial policies such as the Chips Act and the Inflation Reduction Act have incentivized US manufacturing investments, but Chinese companies have refrained from participating due to the US decoupling strategy and restrictive economic policies targeting China. While having a Chinese background was once advantageous in Silicon Valley, this favorable perception has
shifted, with Chinese capital, even from the
private sector, now being viewed as a hindrance, raising concerns within the US.
Additionally, the US is developing a plan to restrict new American investments in critical Chinese technology industries, requiring US firms to disclose their investments in high-tech sectors in China. This forthcoming measure is expected to provide the US government with enhanced oversight over private companies’ foreign transactions, potentially leading to referrals to the Justice Department for criminal prosecution.
Third, interpersonal exchanges and communication between the people of the US and China are facing further challenges. Despite the efforts of leaders in both Beijing and Washington, people-to-people exchanges are declining and struggling to recover.
During “China Week”, the House of Representatives approved the revival of the surveillance program known as the “China Initiative”, initially presented as a national security measure but which turned out to be a witch hunt. After its introduction in 2018, numerous academics and scientists of Chinese descent were wrongly accused of espionage before the program ended in 2022. This resurgence of the China Initiative, now the “CCP Initiative”, is expected to create significant obstacles for academic exchanges between the two nations.
One of the foundational agreements between the US and China, the Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement, was originally signed by then-president Jimmy Carter and Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping during the latter’s visit to the US in 1979. Despite its historical significance, this agreement has been extended for periods of just six months after lapsing multiple times. Recent legislative actions requiring congressional notification for science and technology agreements further underscore the complexities surrounding bilateral cooperation in these critical areas.
The containment of China’s ascent is likely to exacerbate global divisions during a period when the world economy is threatened by recession and grappling with conflicts in regions like Europe and the Middle East
Fourth, the vilification of China by US politicians may not yield positive outcomes, but could exacerbate negative perceptions and tensions between the two nations. The negative perceptions of Americans toward China and vice versa have been on the rise in recent years.
Congressional hearings have seen individuals subjected to intense questioning and accusations, contributing to a climate of suspicion and hostility toward China. TikTok’s Singaporean CEO, Shou Zi Chew, had to endure a grueling five-hour interrogation. Lawmakers directed a barrage of questions at him, focusing on allegations of the app’s potential involvement in spying and surveillance, even casting doubt on Chew’s citizenship during the intense questioning.
The Republican lawmakers who hold the majority in the House and lead the “China Week” legislation were accused by Democrats of leveraging it for political purposes during an election year. But the bipartisan support for China-related bills reflects a prevailing sense of paranoia in Washington, potentially rooted in an exaggerated view of China’s influence.
Finally, the suspicious actions taken by Capitol Hill may not necessarily strengthen the US’ ability to compete with China or enhance its power. However, during this presidential election year, Congress has implemented measures that could further distance the two nations.
Beijing may have concluded that the outcome of the 2024 US election may not significantly affect its strategic approach. Nevertheless, it is crucial for Beijing to handle its relationship with the adversarial Congress cautiously and avoid prematurely assuming complicity on the part of the White House in any potential conspiracy.
The containment of China’s ascent is likely to exacerbate global divisions during a period when the world economy is threatened by recession and grappling with conflicts in regions like Europe and the Middle East. The legislative actions during “China Week” indicate that escalating tensions between the US and China may persist for decades to come.
The author is an associate vice-president of the University of Hong Kong, and the founding director of the HKU Institute for China Business.
The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.
